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As I am writing this paper, the Covid-19 pandemic of 2020 rages 
on. Its economic and social effects in the vast majority of countries 
around the world are palpable. Furthermore, there are some 
emerging and, as I will argue, paradoxical cultural effects of this 
pandemic in some parts of the world, which, in my view, warrant 
some philosophical reflection. I am talking about the US, with which 
I am more familiar. Since the reopening of the economy that started 
in mid-April, 2020, promoted by the Trump administration under 
the slogan “Opening up America Again”1, the issue of wearing a 
protective face mask in public has gained prominence, no less 
because it (and its absence) has in fact become a symbol and a signal 
in the culture wars between liberals2 and conservatives. Wearing a 
mask is, of course, recommended by the government, but on the 
street3 it has gained new and unexpected powers: if you are not 
wearing a mask, you are seen by liberals as a selfish and criminal 
Trump supporter who does not care about his/her fellow human 
beings; and if you wear one, you are seen by conservatives as a 
virtue-signaling, moral grandstanding arrogant liberal.  
 I am not interested in participating in this culture war, but 
rather I want to point out a philosophically interesting feature of the 
 
1 The White House guidelines under this heading were launched on April 16, 
2020: https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/Guidelines-
for-Opening-Up-America-Again.pdf 
2 I will use the term “liberals” throughout the essay as denoting American 
supporters of the Democratic Party or of Left ideologies and organizations 
within the US, not people with classical liberal or libertarian leanings. This use 
of the term is an anomaly, of course, but it is yet another manifestation of 
American exceptionalism. 
3 To say nothing of social media. Indeed, as I’m writing this sentence I have my 
Facebook page open in a tab, and I see a liberal dear friend’s post containing 
the photo of a mask with the following text under it: “A mask is not a political 
statement. It is an IQ test”. This creative political statement is, as it is apparent 
to the intelligent reader, self-defeating.  
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liberals’ attitude toward wearing masks, namely, that it is 
incoherent, given what the liberal consensus seems to have been 
with respect to one of the most discussed issues in applied moral 
philosophy: women’s right to abort. In what follows, I will first 
explain why the issue of wearing or not wearing a mask is indeed a 
moral one (section 1), then briefly review the liberal position on 
whether women have a right to their own body in a way that permits 
abortion of a fetus; Judith Jarvis Thomson’s seminal paper 
defending the liberal position will be used as the test case for one’s 
liberalism. In the third section I will argue that the two issues—
mask-wearing and abortion—are perfectly analogous (or rather 
more than analogous – to be explained in due course) morally 
speaking, and that a liberal should not consider wearing a mask as a 
moral obligation; hence, liberals should refrain from morally 
criticizing those who refuse to wear it. 
 
1. The moral issue of mask-wearing during a pandemic 
There is substantial and growing empirical evidence that wearing a 
face mask during a viral epidemic reduces the risk of human-to-
human transmission of the viral pathogens, including that of the 
Influenza virus and the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome 
Coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) (Cowling et al 2010, Eikenberry et 
al 2020, Liu et al 2020). In other words, although the mask does not 
protect you much from contacting the virus, it does protect others 
from you transmitting it and thus infecting them. During such an 
epidemic or pandemic, you, even when asymptomatic, are a 
potential negative externality for other people’s health, and so is 
everyone else. This means that, prima facie, your choice of wearing 
or not wearing an appropriate mask is a moral choice. Indeed, more 
authoritarian countries (e.g. China, Turkey) have temporarily 
imposed wearing a mask in all public spaces, including open-air 
ones, whereas even very liberal ones (e.g. the US and the UK) 
recommend citizens to wear one in closed spaces.  
 The media is no less active in promoting mask-wearing, and 
opinion makers, bloggers, influencers make free use of the rhetoric 
of moral responsibility towards others, especially the vulnerable 
ones, with low immune response to viral exposure –“wear a mask, 
you’re killing Grandma!”. 
 If mask-wearing is a moral issue, we can frame it in terms of 
two deontic notions, permission and obligation. It is morally 
obligatory to wear a mask (equivalent to “it is not morally 
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permissible not to wear one”) if you care about your fellow human 
beings. This claim has a conditional form, and thus it is not the 
strongest way to formulate the alleged moral obligation to wear a 
mask. What we need is the unconditional “You ought to care about 
others’ health!” It is this deontic command that becomes 
problematic in the context of the peculiarities of the liberal 
consensus on an (I will argue) analogous moral issue, that of 
abortion and its relation to responsibility towards an entity other 
than yourself. 
 
2. Liberalism about abortion 
In 1971, Judith Jarvis Thomson published the most influential paper 
in applied moral philosophy “A defense of abortion”. Among other 
seminal ideas, the essay was groundbreaking in that it offered a new 
venue for liberals to defend abortion. The orthodoxy prior to 
Thomson’s paper used to be that the moral defensibility of abortion 
depends on a good reason to deny that fetuses have the right to live, 
just like born babies, who are considered persons.4 Thomson argued 
that even if the fetus has a right to live, that does not entail that the 
woman pregnant with it has an obligation to carry it to term. The 
main thought experiment she put forward was that of the world-
famous unconscious violinist who you find yourself one morning in 
bed with. He has a fatal kidney ailment and the Society of Music 
Lovers has connected his circulatory system to yours without asking 
for your consent first. Thomson argues that it is morally permissible 
to unplug yourself from the violinist even if this will cause his death, 
the reason being that the violinist’s right to life does not include a 
right to use your body contrary to your will. Your right to your own 
body trumps his right to life in such a case, so if you decide to keep 
him alive that is morally supererogatory: “if you do allow him to go 
on using your kidneys, this is a kindness on your part, and not 
something he can claim from you as his due” (Thomson 1971: 55). 
In effect, the crucial distinction that Thomson’s paper succeeded in 
revealing via the violinist thought experiment is that between the 
 
4 As it turns out, it is not clear whether the assumption that newborns are 
persons with rights is that obvious. Michael Tooley (1974) made an argument 
for infanticide notorious, arguing that if the liberal about abortion is to be 
consistent, she should also support infanticide since birth is not really a 
metaphysical dividing line between non-personhood and personhood. The 
argument has recently been revived and created a media storm in the 
American conservative press in guise of an essay on what the authors called 
“after-birth abortion” (Giubilini and Minerva 2013). Peter Singer (1993) is also a 
defender of the argument. My own criticism of it is in REDACTED. 
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right to life and the right to whatever is needed to sustain life, and 
that forms the basis of a coherent liberal position on abortion that 
combines its permissibility (which only violates an alleged right to 
access whatever is required to sustain life) with the existence of a 
right to life. 
 Most of the criticism directed at Thomson’s argument over 
the five decades since its publication centers around whether the 
violinist analogy is legitimate. I want to pick one out as relevant to 
our topic of mask wearing. The responsibility objection (Davis 
1983, Silverstein 1987, Boonin-Vail 1997, McMahan 2002: ch. 9), 
to which Thomson already offered another original and insightful 
thought experiment: the people-seeds. The objection is that there is 
an important disanalogy between the violinist case and pregnancy, 
namely, the former is involuntary whereas the latter, except when a 
consequence of rape, is the result of a voluntary act, undertaken in 
full knowledge of the chance a pregnancy might result from it. If 
this disanalogy exists and if it is morally relevant, then except for 
the case of rape, the pregnant woman has a moral obligation to carry 
to term, which obligation is grounded in her knowledge of possible 
consequences and hence responsibility for those consequences. 
Thomson puts forward the following thought experiment: 
 
“(…) suppose it were like this: people-seeds drift about in 
the air like pollen, and if you open your windows, one may 
drift in and take root in your carpets or upholstery. You 
don't want children, so you fix up your windows with fine 
mesh screens, the very best you can buy. As can happen, 
however, and on very, very rare occasions does happen, 
one of the screens is defective, and a seed drifts in and takes 
root. Does the person-plant who now develops have a right 
to the use of your house? Surely not--despite the fact that 
you voluntarily opened your windows, you knowingly kept 
carpets and upholstered furniture, and you knew that 
screens were sometimes defective. Someone may argue 
that you are responsible for its rooting, that it does have a 
right to your house, because after all you could have lived 
out your life with bare floors and furniture, or with sealed 
windows and doors. But this won't do—for by the same 
token anyone can avoid a pregnancy due to rape by having 
a hysterectomy, or anyway by never leaving home without 
a (reliable!) army.” (1971: 59) 
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There could be a lot to discuss here but let me focus on two points. 
One is about the criteria for the correct application of the predicate 
“___ is responsible for ___”, the other about the crucial importance 
of the cost conditions for the whole Thomson-style argumentation 
for the permissibility of abortion to get off the ground.  
 The people-seeds thought experiment nicely brings forth the 
need to argue for a threshold of thoroughness of precautionary 
measures beyond which it becomes unreasonable to hold someone 
responsible for a certain consequence. The idea is that, intuitively, 
there are a lot of risks around, some quite small but with serious 
consequences, and there is a limit of reasonableness of how much 
effort and resources one is supposed to invest in order to avoid those 
risks. Indeed, pregnancy can happen even of one took reasonably 
serious precautionary measures, and in those case, even though 
one’s actions were not sufficient for avoiding the consequence, one 
is not to be considered responsible, let alone blamable for those 
consequences. 
 The second point is that the Thomson-style argument for the 
permissibility of abortion can only even get off the ground on the 
condition of there being a serious enough cost of not aborting. 
Indeed, at the end of her paper, Thomson makes this clear by 
pointing out that her argument was not that all abortion is 
permissible, but that some is; there are, on the other hand, cases 
when it is impermissible, namely, when there are no costs in keeping 
the fetus alive, for example, when the woman aborts just to avoid 
the nuisance of postponing a trip abroad (1971: 65–66 ), or perhaps 
if/when in the future we will have alternatives to pregnancy to carry 
fetuses to term.5 
 The liberal consensus, in effect, seems to be that (a) the 
woman has no obligation to provide life support to anyone, 
including her own fetus, and that (b) pregnancy is costly enough for 
the woman to justify the permissibility of abortion, if there are no 
alternative methods for the fetus to be carried to term. 
 
 
3. Liberalism about mask-wearing 
Here is how the situation of the Covid-19 pandemic is analogous to 
the data in the Thomson type argument. 
 
5 Cf. McMahan 2002: 378.  
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 First, we have at least one person (typically many such 
persons around us) whose health depends to a certain extent on our 
protecting them from contracting the virus. My mask does not 
protect me much, but it protects those I interact with.  
 Second, I have reason to wear a mask to the extent that I am 
a good Samaritan (to use Thomson’s own way of putting it). That is, 
if I wear it to protect others, it is because I am kind, not because I 
have a moral obligation to do it. The reason is the same as in the 
violinist case: the separateness of persons. It is the same reason why 
it would be immoral for the government to impose some serious 
burden on my body, against my will, to keep some people alive. 
 Third, there is a serious enough burden in wearing a face 
mask. It is important to understand that we are not talking about 
wearing a face mask for an hour a day or so, but about wearing it all 
the time whenever in the vicinity of people, changing it every four 
hours, as they become ineffective (at least the surgical ones), making 
sure we have spare masks with us all the time. All this for several 
months, if experts are right that the pandemic situation is going to 
last months if not years. I think the costs, though not the same, are 
at least comparable to those of the nine months of pregnancy. 
Fourth, vulnerable people, e.g. the elderly, the 
immunosuppressed, and the ill, are comparably dependent for life 
support on us, healthy subjects, protecting them by wearing a mask. 
Again, the dependency is less strong, but it is comparable.  
Fifth, there are no alternatives, at the moment, to the three 
types of protective measures we know to work: personal hygiene, 
social distancing, and mask-wearing. If there were, we would not 
have reason to put up with mask-wearing and social distancing at 
all.  
Finally, here is the way in which the case of mask-wearing 
is, from a liberal perspective, more than analogous to the case of 
abortion when it comes to practical consequences: whereas in the 
abortion case there is a prima facie case to be made for the existence 
of a special and tight emotional and social connection between the 
subjects involved in the conflict of rights (the pregnant woman and 
the fetus), in the case of wearing a mask on the street and at the 
grocery store to protect complete strangers such a connection is 
clearly out of question. In this sense, what I claim is not merely that 
if you are a liberal about abortion, then mutatis mutandis you should 
not hold the view that wearing a mask during a pandemic is a moral 
obligation, but that a fortiori you should reject such a moral 
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obligation. In other words, if there are disanalogies between 
pregnancy and mask-wearing from the point of view of the conflict 
of rights, they actually point in the direction of there being an even 
clearer case against mask-wearing as a moral obligation than there 
is against carrying fetuses to term.  
It is therefore paradoxical, or, to be more accurate, a 
practical inconsistency on the part of American liberals (and liberals 
in other parts of the developed world, to the extent that there are 
such counterparts of the American ones, who make a moral fuss 
about mask-wearing) to be so invested in the attitude of mask-
wearing and in the moral condemnation of Trump supporters who 
refuse to wear it. If the argument from personal and bodily 
autonomy works well in supporting a woman’s right to terminate 
pregnancy and not care about the fact that another being, with a right 
to life, needs life support, then it should work even better in the case 
against an alleged moral obligation to change one’s behavior, 
clothing, and lifestyle for the sake of protecting other people’s 
health. 
Of course, I am not saying that there is no argument for the 
moral obligation to wear a mask during a pandemic, but that there is 
no such liberal argument. It is easy to imagine prima facie such 
arguments by Kantians, by communitarians, and by utilitarians. 
Indeed, as an example of the last one, Peter Singer already 
formulated the Utilitarian case against the permissibility of abortion 
in Thomson style situations: 
 
In rejecting Thomson's theory of rights, and with it her 
judgment in the case of the violinist, the utilitarian would 
also be rejecting her argument for abortion. Thomson 
claimed that her argument justified abortion even if we 
allowed the life of the fetus to count as heavily as the life 
of a normal person. The utilitarian would say that it would 
be wrong to refuse to sustain a person's life for nine months, 
if that was the only way the person could survive. 
Therefore, if the life of the fetus is given the same weight 
as the life of a normal person, the utilitarian would say that 
it would be wrong to refuse to carry the fetus until it can 
survive outside the womb. (1993: 149) 
 
 It is easy and straightforward to apply this utilitarian reasoning to 
the issue of mask-wearing. By wearing a mask, one clearly 
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maximizes public utility as compared to not wearing it – protecting 
many people rather than only oneself. This is true even on the 
simplest form of act-utiliarianism and even more so on rule-
utilitarian versions. 
 To conclude, the liberal attitude and behavior toward mask-
wearing during the Covid-19 pandemic proves to be more based on 
animus than on a coherent applied liberal moral view. 
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